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 Governments around the world provide financial incentives to encourage 
renewable energy generation and energy conservation. The primary goals of these efforts 
are to mitigate climate change and improve long-term energy independence by reducing 
reliance on fossil fuels. The consensus in the energy incentive literature is that 
performance-based incentives, which fund energy output, are more cost efficient than 
investment-based incentives, which fund capital input. This thesis uses a 30-year case 
study of Oregon‟s Business Energy Tax Credit (BETC) program to argue that 
investment-based energy incentives are moderately cost efficient relative to other state 
performance-based incentives and can be an effective driver of clean energy deployment. 
However, this analysis also finds that there are significant opportunities to improve the 
cost efficiency of investment-based energy incentive programs by targeting least cost 
projects. Namely, 50% of the first year kilowatt-hour electricity returns of the BETC 
program could have been achieved at 10% of the cost. These lessons from historical 
BETC spending should guide policymakers, NGO‟s, and businesses who aim to make 
targeted use of fiscally-constrained energy incentive programs. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 The vast majority of the world‟s electricity and transportation network is built 
around three fossil fuel sources: coal, oil and natural gas (REN21, 2010). These fuel 
sources are finite—most notably oil, which is often imported at great cost—and produce 
significant greenhouse gas emissions contributing to global climate change. Governments 
have long recognized the long-term importance of transitioning to a “cleaner” energy 
economy. Clean energy sources are defined here as those that directly reduce fossil fuel 
consumption, such as energy efficiency and conservation (heretofore combined under the 
umbrella term “conservation”1), and those that indirectly offset fossil fuels, such as 
renewable electricity generation (solar photovoltaics, wind, etc.). The key follow-up 
question is which government policies are the most effective and cost efficient drivers of 
clean energy deployment.  
 Governments and public entities have enacted a wide array of policy tools to spur 
the development of renewable energy and conservation. These policy tools include quota-
type mandates for renewable electricity and energy efficiency; research, development and 
deployment (RD&D); transportation initiatives; and other approaches that target clean 
energy indirectly, such as carbon pricing (DSIRE, 2011; IEA, 2011). One of the most 
widely-used tools among national and sub-national governments has been financial 
incentives—in the form of subsidies or tax credits—to entice clean energy developers to 
implement renewable energy and conservation projects. 
 The energy incentive debate is largely centered on which policy design structure 
induces the greatest clean energy deployment (policy effectiveness) at the least cost 
(policy cost efficiency) (Gan et al., 2007; Sovacool, 2010). The main categorical 
distinction is made between performance-based energy incentives, which fund projects 
based on the output of energy produced or conserved, and investment-based energy 
                                                 
1
 The umbrella term “conservation” is used to denote both energy efficiency, which uses technology to 
produce the same end product while using less energy (e.g., weatherization), and conservation, which uses 
behavior or process change to use less energy (e.g., bicycle programs). 
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incentives, which fund projects based on the input of initial capital investment. 
Performance-based energy incentives are generally argued to be more effective and cost 
efficient than investment-based energy incentives at achieving clean energy outcomes 
(Sovacool, 2010; Loiter & Norberg-Bohm, 1999; Cox et al., 1991). This analysis 
provides evidence that investment-based tax credits can be an effective and cost efficient 
tool for stimulating clean energy activity in comparison to performance-based energy 
incentives.  
 In addition to evaluating the effectiveness and cost efficiency of investment-based 
programs in aggregate, this case study also examines the specific types of investments 
that have been most effective and cost efficient within an investment-based program. In 
the academic literature, little attention has been paid to the reform of existing investment-
based energy incentive policies, despite the fact that hundreds of national and sub-
national programs still exist (DSIRE, 2011; IEA, 2011). Through an investigation of 
historical public spending patterns on clean electricity, this paper offers evidence on 
which technologies are most cost efficient and effective. Foremost, waste heat recovery, 
wind, biomass and conservation provide the least cost annual electricity return on public 
investment. An even more granular assessment evaluates cost efficiency and 
effectiveness on a project-to-project level, which finds further room for the improvement 
of investment-based energy incentives. In this case study, roughly 50% of the annual 
clean electricity could have been achieved with 10% of the incentives, and about 90% 
could have been achieved with 50% of the incentives. These results suggest that there are 
significant opportunities to make investment-based energy incentives more effective and 
cost efficient, despite their relative advantages compared to a sample of performance-
based energy incentives.  
 Oregon‟s Business Energy Tax Credit (BETC) program is an ideal case study for 
this investigation: BETC is one the largest and longest-standing examples of an 
investment-based energy incentive program. The program began in 1979 as a modest 
response to the oil crisis, providing limited tax credit funding for business conservation 
and renewable projects. The program has grown substantially in size and scope over the 
last decade, which has led to increasing demands on the program to be effective and cost 
efficient (Kuehl, 2011, Esteve, 2011). This independent 30-year review of BETC 
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spending provides much-needed evidence on the relationship between taxpayer energy 
incentives and energy policy goals. These lessons from historical BETC spending should 
guide policymakers, NGO‟s, and businesses who aim to make targeted use of fiscally-
constrained energy incentive programs. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. The Benefits of Clean Energy Deployment 
 Renewable energy generation and conservation provide many public benefits that 
make them economically, socially and ecologically desirable. The four most common 
benefits cited for clean energy development are: 1) environmental improvement; 2) 
energy security; 3) economic development; and 4) employment (Liao et al., 2011). This 
wide range of potential benefits has brought significant political weight to the issue of 
clean energy procurement in recent years.   
 The role of clean energy in the mitigation of global climate change deserves 
particular emphasis. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change outlined in their 
2007 report the predicted environmental consequences of business-as-usual greenhouse 
gas pollution: rising sea levels, desertification, extreme weather events and flooding, 
species extinction, ocean acidification and the loss of coral reefs. The Global 
Humanitarian Forum (GHF) argues that climate change is already causing significant 
harm to human populations at a 1 degree Celsius rise in temperature. GHF estimates that 
300,000 perish and 325 million people are seriously affected by climate change annually, 
coupled with $US125 billion in economic losses (2009). Climate change impacts have 
already been observed in the United States, including increased frequency of intense 
downpours and reduced snow cover; future problems include more intense hurricanes and 
storm surges, and issues with human health, water supply, and agricultural stability (U.S. 
GCRP, 2009). Climate researchers have confirmed that at least some further harmful 
effects of climate change are inevitable (Eilperin, 2009), but that clean energy 
deployment has the ability to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions stemming from the 
energy system. The climate mitigation benefits of clean energy also coincide with local, 
national, and international climate obligations, such as statewide goals or the Kyoto 
Protocol (EEA, 2004). Reduction of greenhouse gases and environmental sustainability 
are generally considered to be the most important outcomes of renewable energy 
proliferation (Shen et al., 2010). 
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 Other benefits of clean energy include net increases in energy security, 
employment and economic development. Since most regions must import a significant 
amount of their total energy portfolio, energy conservation and homegrown renewable 
supply stabilize energy prices and reduce the chance of external energy shocks (Liao et 
al., 2011). Domestic buildout also provides an opportunity for growing local energy 
technology markets and developing export industries. These industrial sectors can 
become dynamic and prosperous segments of regional economies. Clean energy can also 
increase economic production by reducing electricity costs and increasing reliability of 
the grid in the long term (Liao et al., 2011). These clean energy industries can also 
provide significant means for maintaining and catalyzing local employment needs; 
economies in transition are particularly amenable to these benefits of renewable 
deployment (Liao et al., 2011). The Center for American Progress argues that clean-
energy investments create 16.7 jobs per $1 million in spending, compared to 5.3 jobs for 
fossil fuels (PERI, 2009). During periods of economic turmoil, these economic and 
employment benefits take on increasing political importance. 
2.2. Policy Rationale for Promoting Clean Energy 
 Clean energy faces significant market barriers that prevent these economic, social 
and ecological benefits from accruing. The most relevant economic theory for 
incentivizing clean energy deployment is the concept of externalities (Metcalf, 2009). 
The production and consumption of fossil fuels produce pollution—air, water, and 
greenhouse gas emissions—that are borne by society-at-large rather than the individual 
producers and consumers of fossil fuels. Unpriced greenhouse gas emissions are arguably 
the greatest externality that the world has ever known (Stern, 2007). Since the market 
does not inherently account for these external costs of production, “only government can 
solve the failure of the market to account for [the] unintended consequences of market 
activity” (Mann, 2010, p. 400; Pigou, 1920). Economic theory concludes that social 
welfare can be improved through governmental action to internalize these external 
market costs.  
 Ideal conditions dictate that a “Pigouvian” tax be applied at the rate at which the 
pollution imposes costs on society (Tietenberg, 2006). However, political reality often 
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requires that governments apply an economically imperfect Pigouvian subsidy to promote 
externality-reducing activity rather than taxing external costs directly (Metcalf, 2009). 
Subsidies incur two distortions on the market: first, they reduce energy prices, thereby 
creating a distortion on the margin between energy and non-energy consumption; second, 
“they generate distortions among the externality-reducing technologies in a way that 
raises the cost of achieving policy goals while doing so in a fairly opaque way” (Metcalf, 
2009, p. 526). Financial incentives to spur clean energy, as a form of Pigouvian subsidy, 
are therefore an economically imperfect but political amenable policy tool for 
overcoming environmental externalities. 
 Similarly, environmental amenities such as climate stability and clean water, as 
well as the public health outcomes that result from their protection, are public goods 
subject to collective action problems (Hardin, 1968). Energy security, which is derived 
from the long-term stability of the energy system, is also a public good akin to national 
security. Without market signals dictating the protection of these public goods, Hardin‟s 
“Tragedy of the Commons” theory hypothesizes that these goods become degraded over 
time. Free riders benefit from the protection of public goods without personal cost, which 
stifles collective action that would benefit all. Thus, public recourse has the opportunity 
to improve public welfare by imposing or incentivizing the protection of public goods. In 
this vein, governments create incentives for renewable energy and conservation that 
promote the collective benefits of climate stability and other public goods (Tietenberg, 
2006). 
 Technical gains that result in increased productivity of capital are themselves a 
public good. Individual firms under-invest in capital and technological improvement 
because they do not internalize the broader social gains from learning (Palmer & 
Burtraw, 2005; Arrow, 1962). The introduction of a new technology is a form of positive 
externality, whereby the benefits of the new technology are not entirely borne by the 
individual or firm (Tietenberg, 2006). Cox et al. examine how this played out in early 
wind turbine development in California: 
 
In 1980 a company that undertook the task of developing an economical 
wind machine could not ensure that it would receive an adequate return on 
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its investment in research. If the technology is easily imitated, with slight 
variations to avoid patent infringement, competition would limit the 
financial return from research and development. […] the federal and 
California governments decided that the most appropriate way to 
overcome the roadblocks to wind power development was the 
establishment of generous tax credits and price guarantees for electricity 
sales. (1991, p. 349) 
 
The government in the U.S. has a long history of using RD&D and other public subsidies 
to foster the technological development of industry, including railroads, aviation, 
microchips, and the Internet (Breakthrough Institute, 2009). The positive externalities and 
public good nature of technical gains are further justifications for incentives to promote 
clean energy development. 
 Energy incentives for clean energy, in addition to addressing externalities and 
public goods, allow clean energy to compete with direct government subsidies for fossil 
fuel production. According to Liao et al., “the first challenge to reach free market 
mechanism is to recognize the incentives/subsidies that are built into the supply systems 
of conventional fuels” (2011, p. 790). Distorting markets with clean energy subsidies to 
balance fossil-based market distortions is an imperfect solution for overcoming market 
barriers. The long-term aim is to remove all public subsidies and to tax external costs at 
the margin equal to the marginal costs imposed on society (Liao et al., 2011). 
 While these justifications for promoting clean energy are largely economic, one 
last argument is ethical in nature. The climate dilemma involves economic sacrifice in 
order to protect the well-being of future generations. Climate change, in ways unique 
from other policy motivations, requires a moral argument in defense of intergenerational 
equity. For further discussion of the ethical dimensions of climate mitigation, see: Weiss, 
1990; Gardiner, 2006; and Caney, 2005. 
2.3. Policy Alternatives to Energy Incentives 
 According to economic theory, subsidies in the form of financial incentives for 
clean energy deployment are an imperfect tool for reducing negative externalities and 
cultivating public goods. Direct taxes are more effective and cost efficient tools for 
achieving the benefits of clean energy—particularly when the goal is greenhouse gas 
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reduction rather than energy deployment (Metcalf, 2009). Palmer & Burtraw (2005) 
investigate the ability of different energy policies to achieve cost-efficient carbon 
emissions reductions from renewable energy dissemination. These authors find that a 
carbon pricing scheme, such as a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade policy, is more efficient 
than either a quota-type mandate or a performance-based energy incentive for reducing 
carbon emissions. Hassett & Metcalf argue that energy subsidies are difficult to justify on 
economic grounds and that a carbon price would make energy incentives unnecessary 
(2006). However, Metcalf admits that political reality means “in large measure, we 
subsidize energy activities that we would like to encourage rather than tax activities that 
we would like to discourage” (2009, p. 523). 
 The debate on the efficacy and cost efficiency of quantity-based mechanisms 
versus price-based mechanisms is more unclear, both in terms of the ability to reduce 
carbon emissions and to deploy clean energy. Table 1 provides a summary of the 
common categories of quantity- and price-based energy policies. 
 
Table 1: Fundamental Types of Regulatory Strategies 
Price-Driven Capacity-Driven
Investment Focused Rebates Bidding
Tax Incentives
Generation Based Feed-In Tariffs Quotas
Rate-Based Incentives
Source: Haas et al., 2004
 
 Quantity-based (“Capacity-driven”) policies include quotas that mandate a 
percentage of energy come from renewable sources by a given deadline. In an assessment 
of wind policies in U.S. states, quotas were found to be more effective at driving wind 
power than financial instruments; however, financial instruments were also found to 
wield “a great deal of influence” (Bird et al., 2005, p. 1407). Other studies have also 
found price-based mechanisms to be either less effective than quantity-based mechanisms 
or not effective at all in driving renewable energy (Menz, 2005; Menz & Vachon, 2006; 
Loiter & Norberg-Bohm, 1999; Palmer & Burtraw, 2005). It is worth noting these studies 
favoring quantity-based mechanisms are based on existing policies within the United 
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States. Feed-In Tariffs (FITs), which have been common in the international community 
but not in North America, are a price-based policy that have been shown to be more 
effective and cost efficient than quantity-based tools in many studies (see: next section). 
The question is therefore not only of price-based versus quantity-based energy policies, 
but of designing energy incentives to be most effective and cost efficient. 
2.4. Investment- Versus Performance-Based Energy Incentives 
 Performance-based energy incentives (labeled “Generation Based” incentives in 
Table 1) are generally found to be more effective and cost efficient than investment-
based energy incentives, although there is significant variation based on the design of the 
program. In particular, feed-in tariffs (FITs) stand out as “the world‟s most successful 
policy mechanism for stimulating the rapid development of renewable energy” (Singh & 
Sood, 2011, p. 661). A FIT establishes long-term, fixed price contracts for the purchase 
of renewable energy (including solar, wind, etc.). These incentives are most effective 
when they scale down gradually over time at the rate of technological cost reductions and 
differentiate based on region and resource intensity (Singh & Sood, 2011). A survey of 
electricity stakeholders in Southeast Asia found that FITs were the preferred policy 
mechanism of 61% of respondents (see: Figure 1) (Sovacool, 2010). FIT was the only 
policy to satisfy all of the analytical criteria of efficacy, cost effectiveness, dynamic 
efficiency, equity, and fiscal responsibility. The study cites evidence from Germany that 
the FIT “lowered the average market price of electricity, displaced inefficient and more 
polluting power plants, and reduced energy dependence and the costs of importing coal 
and other fossil fuels” (Sovacool, 2010,  p. 1790). Investment tax credits (ITCs), one of 
the most common forms of investment-based energy incentives, were argued not to meet 
the criteria of efficacy (“ITCs have been subject to regulatory uncertainty and have 
frequently expired”), cost efficiency (“ITCs create little incentive to keep costs down”) or 
fiscally responsibility (“ITCs require continuous government funding”) (Sovacool, 2010, 
p. 1787). Production Tax Credits (PTCs), a form of performance-based energy incentive 
that funds renewable energy output on a per kWh basis, was found to be similarly flawed. 
However, PTCs were found to be more cost efficient than ITCs because they provide 
money for renewable production rather than investment (Sovacool, 2010). Gan et al. also 
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found FITs to stand out as the most attractive energy incentive tool, while noting that 
upfront RD&D funding may be needed to develop long-term technological improvement 
and cost reduction (2007). 
 
Figure 1: Most Preferred Policy Mechanisms Selected by Survey Participants 
Source: Sovacool, 2010
*Voluntary Green Power "provides no guarantee that additional renewable energy capacity will be 
built," only that a certain amount of renewable energy be delivered to consumers (1786)
**Public Benefit Funds usually, but not always, fund projects based on investment rather than 
performance
1%
1%
2%
3%
9%
10%
12%
61%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Bidding Systems
Investment Tax Credit
Public Benefit Fund**
Volunt. Green Power*
RD&D
Production Tax Credit
Renewable Quota/RPS
Feed-In Tariff
% of Survey Respondents (n=90)
Performance-
Based Incentive
Investment-Based 
Incentive
Quantity-Based 
 
 Other analyses do not include FIT as a policy option, and focus on the comparison 
between ITCs and PTCs. PTCs have largely been found to be more effective and cost 
efficient at bringing renewable energy to market than ITCs because they fund energy 
outputs rather than capital inputs (Loiter & Norberg-Bohm, 1999; Cox et al, 1991; Mann, 
2010). The explanation underlying the relative efficacy and cost-efficiency of 
performance-based energy incentives is intuitive: “the PTC is better than the ITC because 
it provides continuing incentives to produce renewable energy, rather than providing an 
incentive to invest capital in a renewable project” (Mann, 2010, p. 388). In India, the ITC 
spurred substantial wind power development, but because economic incentives were 
based on installation rather than capacity, turbine performance has been poor (Sovacool, 
2010). In California, the problem of funding inputs was even more dramatic, as some 
companies installed non-functioning wind turbines to receive tax credits. The ITC system 
for wind became “a sort of lottery with developers hoping the benefits of getting credit 
for fake systems outweighed the chances of getting caught” (Sovacool, 2010, p. 1789).  
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 These authors acknowledge that ITCs offer benefits beyond effectiveness and cost 
efficiency, including policy characteristics that make ITCs politically attractive. ITCs are 
less expensively and more easily administered than PTCs, because tracking project 
performance requires more complex monitoring of energy output over time than 
investment-based incentives. ITCs are also more advantageous for spurring developing 
technologies that still have high capital investment cost per unit of electricity output 
(Loiter & Norberg-Bohm, 1999). While PTCs favor lowest cost energy production and 
usually target a narrow band of technologies, ITCs are more flexible to technologies at 
different stages of development. This produces a greater diversification of project types, 
which is more dynamically efficient
2
 and can often lead to long-term innovation and cost-
reductions (Cox et al, 1991; Sovacool, 2010; Haas et al., 2004). Overall, however, the 
literature favors PTCs over ITCs for their clearly defined energy output. Policies should 
“incorporate incentives that encourage production of electricity by renewables rather than 
simply investment in renewable energy capital” (Loiter & Norberg-Bohm, 1999, p. 95). 
 As indicated by the efficacy and cost efficiency of FITs over PTCs—of one 
performance-based energy incentive over another—there are more nuanced policy design 
features that can have a significant impact on the effectiveness and cost efficiency of an 
energy incentive program. Researchers have provided general rules for successful energy 
incentive programs. Policies can best guarantee effectiveness if objectives and policy 
structure are stable and predictable over a long time horizon (Gan et al., 2007). Barradale 
(2010) articulates that reducing uncertainty is a key component of workable clean energy 
deployment strategies. Public policy uncertainty, such as the federal production tax credit 
lapses for wind in 2000, 2002, and 2004, deters long-term private-sector investment in 
renewable technologies. In other words, “stability—the antidote to uncertainty—is […] 
an important criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of policy incentives” (Barradale, 
2010, p. 7706). Quantity-based energy policies are inherently more stable than PTCs and 
ITCs for achieving long-term stability; similarly, FITs are argued to be more effective 
than PTCs and ITCs in part because of the use of long-term, stable contracts (Barradale, 
2010; Sovacool, 2010). 
                                                 
2
 Dynamic efficiency refers to the ability for a policy to promote a diversification of renewable energy 
sources and technologies (Sovacool, 2010, 1785). 
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2.5. The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of Project Types 
 Few studies in the energy incentive literature have investigated returns on 
investment within an individual energy incentive program. Analysts typically compare 
policy types against one another to determine the overall effectiveness and cost 
efficiency. Admittedly, performance-based energy incentives guarantee the tax cost per 
unit of energy and thus provide few avenues for investigating variation in effectiveness 
and cost efficiency within a given program; PTCs, for example, establish definitive 
public costs per unit of renewable energy generation. On the other hand, investment-
based energy incentives fund project inputs and therefore do not guarantee finite 
spending levels per unit of energy output. Investment-based tax credits therefore provide 
an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness and cost efficiency of different investments 
within a singular program. 
 Although this appears to be the first paper on the effectiveness and cost efficiency 
of projects within an investment-based energy incentive program, there have been several 
studies that examine the potential of various project categories and technologies. These 
papers investigate the effectiveness and cost efficiency of project types independent of 
policy design. Shen et al. (2010) investigate six renewable energy sources (solar, 
biomass, geothermal, ocean, wind, and hydropower) for their deployment potential in 
Taiwan based on energy, environmental and economic considerations. The results of their 
15-expert questionnaire favored hydropower, solar and wind technology (see: Table 2). 
 A report by McKinsey & Co. (Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the U.S. Economy) 
assesses both the cost efficiency and scalable potential of assorted energy efficiency 
project types (2009). The underlying idea is that certain project types are more ideal for 
public and private investment, or at least provide better opportunities for low cost energy 
returns in the short-term. For example, increasing the energy efficiency of refrigerators is 
found to be very cost efficient, while increasing the energy efficiency of freezers is found 
to be very cost inefficient. This cost curve is located in Appendix A and will be discussed 
in more detail in Section 3.3. 
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Table 2: The Optimal Non-Fuzzy Performance Value of Six Renewable Energy 
Sources 
Goal Solar Biomass Geo. Ocean Wind Hydro
Energy Energy Price Stability 0.050 4.47 4.49 5.22 4.03 4.85 5.76
Security for Energy Supply 0.119 6.61 5.10 5.34 5.61 5.31 6.48
Low Energy Prices 0.043 2.71 4.12 4.90 4.21 4.72 6.30
Stability for Energy Generation 0.097 5.40 5.10 5.19 4.15 5.46 5.31
Env. Carbon Emissions Reductions 0.122 5.47 4.45 5.52 5.38 6.66 6.80
SOx and NOx Reductions 0.084 5.47 4.15 5.52 5.45 6.66 7.19
Environmental Sustainability 0.143 6.24 4.46 6.31 5.19 6.25 5.95
Low Land Requirement 0.028 3.41 3.44 5.59 6.69 3.78 4.62
Econ. Local Economic Development 0.059 6.99 5.15 4.25 4.46 5.12 4.62
Increasing Employment 0.041 6.39 4.85 3.95 4.21 4.63 3.74
Technical Maturity 0.052 6.70 5.37 3.59 3.50 3.75 6.52
Potential for Commercialization 0.059 6.67 5.19 4.67 3.82 6.04 5.70
Market Size 0.075 7.62 6.43 4.37 5.43 6.43 5.43
Reasonableness for Cost 0.051 2.56 4.37 3.84 2.90 4.74 5.00
Total 5.866 4.906 5.190 4.882 5.729 6.005
Rank 2 5 4 6 2 1
Source: Shen et al. (2010)
Criteria & Aggregate Weight
  
2.6. The Current Landscape of Investment-Based Energy Incentives 
 At the national and sub-national level, governments have instituted a substantial 
array of investment-based energy incentives that fund upfront capital and other project 
inputs. According to the Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE), 22 
states and the federal government have corporate tax incentives that invest in projects 
based on qualifying inputs (2011). As of 2011, the U.S. federal government provides a 
Business Energy Investment Tax Credit worth 30% of certified project costs for solar, 
fuel cells, and small wind facilities; 10% credits are available for geothermal, combined 
heat and power, and other technologies. The state programs vary significantly in size, 
scale, and eligible technologies. For example, as of 2011, North Carolina‟s Renewable 
Energy Tax Credit funds 35% of project costs up to $2.5 million installations; New 
Mexico‟s Advanced Energy Tax Credit funds only 6% of project costs but up to $60 
million installations. Hawaii and many other states only qualify solar and wind, Indiana 
funds only energy conservation, and Missouri and Wisconsin subsidize only woody 
biomass (DSIRE, 2011). 
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 Complementing these corporate investment tax credits are a series of related 
investment-based energy incentive policies at the statewide level. 29 states have property 
tax incentives for renewable projects, 27 have grant programs for renewable and energy 
efficiency programs, 26 have rebate incentive programs for clean energy investment, 26 
have sales tax incentives for renewable energy and manufacturing projects, 19 states have 
public benefit funds, and 3 have green building incentives (DSIRE, 2011). These 
investment-based energy incentives can be found at the international level as well: China 
has tax reductions for biogas and wind energy development; Ghana has reduced import 
duties and sales taxes on solar and wind systems; and the Czech Republic has a five year 
tax exemption on a variety of renewable energy systems (IEA, 2011). All of these 
national and state-level energy incentive programs are based on technical project inputs 
rather than on energy output. These investment-based energy incentive programs broadly 
parallel the funding structure of Oregon‟s Business Energy Tax Credit system. 
2.7. Oregon’s Business Energy Tax Credit Program 
 Oregon‟s Business Energy Tax Credit (BETC) program is an ideal case study for 
analyzing investment-based energy incentive policies. The program that began as a 
modest response to the oil-based price shocks of the 1970‟s has expanded in size and 
scope over the course of the 2000‟s to become one of the largest energy incentive 
programs in the U.S (Kuehl, 2010). The high caps on incentives and the diversity of 
funded technologies provide significant evidence for the evaluation of investment-based 
energy incentive programs. 
 BETC began in 1979 to “encourage the conservation of electricity, petroleum, and 
natural gas by providing tax relief for Oregon facilities that conserve energy resources or 
meet energy requirements through the use of renewable resources” (Kuehl, 2010, p. 704). 
The program began with a $30 million program cap, and a 35% per project tax credit 
capped at $3.5 million (Kuehl, 2010). These energy incentives, in the form of tax credits, 
were intended to promote investment in conservation and renewable projects by allowing 
developers to recuperate a percentage of upfront project costs. 
 The restructuring of the ODOE in the 1990‟s coincided with a scaling back of the 
program, reducing the maximum tax credit for most projects from $3.5 million to 
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$100,000. However, in 1999, the legislature raised the cap on individual projects to $10 
million (Kuehl, 2010). In 2001, the Oregon legislature expanded the “pass-through” 
option that allowed taxpayers to sell their tax credits to entities with larger tax liability; 
previously limited to utilities, the pass-through expansion allowed developers without the 
proper tax appetite to benefit from tax credit incentives, including non-profits, schools, 
government agencies, tribes, small businesses and individuals (ODOE, 2010). The pass-
through option allows tax credits to become equivalent to cash subsidies for would-be 
clean energy developers, although at less than the face value of the tax credit
3
. The pass-
through option has substantially increased the number and size of clean energy projects in 
Oregon (Esteve, 2009b). About 60% of projects utilized the pass-through option in 2008 
(ODOE, 2009).  
 HB 3201 and HB 3619, enacted during the summer of 2007 and the spring of 
2008, respectively, increased the tax credit for renewable facilities and manufacturing 
from 35% to 50% of certified project costs and raised the tax credit cap for large 
renewable manufacturing projects to $20 million (DSIRE, 2011; Esteve, 2009b; Kuehl, 
2010). Caps for renewable energy and conservation projects remained at $10 million. 
Expected costs for the biennial period 2009-11 are estimated at $185 million in tax 
credits (Esteve, 2011). These taxpayer costs represent a significant portion of Oregon‟s 
roughly $30 billion annual budget (Oregon Blue Book, 2011). 
 The budgetary increases have made BETC increasingly controversial. Critics of 
the BETC program have called the tax credits a big giveaway to business, claiming that 
costs have far outrun estimates and that the program includes major structural flaws. A 
series of articles in the The Oregonian detailed the controversy: program costs that were 
40 times more than lawmakers expected ($40 million versus $1.2 million); liberal 
distribution of tax credits (such as three Klondike wind farms receiving a total of $33 
million); prolific funding for botched projects; and a rubber stamp Department of Energy, 
citing that 97% of all applications have been approved since the BETC program began 
(Duin, 2010; Esteve, 2009a; ODOE, 2009). One commentator wrote: “Records show that 
                                                 
3
 The pass-through rate for selling tax credits to other parties is governed by legislative rules. In January 
2010, a tax credit could be sold for roughly 74% of the face value of the credit. A $10 million credit could 
be sold to another party for $7.4 million in cash—this would be the value of the tax credit to a developer 
without the tax liability to use $10 million in tax credits (O‟Neill, 2009) 
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the [BETC] program […] has given millions of dollars to failed companies while voters 
are being asked to raise income taxes because the state budget doesn‟t have enough to 
pay for schools and other programs” (Esteve, 2009a).  
 Oregon implemented a series of changes to mollify demands for more clearly 
defined outcomes in the BETC program. HB 3680, which was codified into law February 
of 2010, placed new financial limits on the program and allowed more discretion for the 
ODOE director (OLA, 2010). Legislators reduced the eligible costs for larger wind 
facilities (over 10 megawatts) from 50% of total project costs to 5%, significantly 
reducing subsidies available for major wind farms. Other changes included more 
stringent operational requirements, elimination of credits for failing and indebted 
applicants and tightened restrictions on multiple tax credits for single projects (ODOE, 
2009). Caps on BETC funding through June 2011 were set at $300 million for renewable 
energy facilities and $200 million for manufacturing facilities (Van‟t Hof & Powell, 
2010). The legislative changes mandated a tiered priority system that forced larger 
projects to compete for these funds based on a series of criteria, including investment 
payback period, expected lifespan of the facility, environmental impacts, and 
employment effects (OLA 2010; Van‟t Hof & Powell, 2010). These changes have made 
the BETC program an investment-performance hybrid, that funds projects based on both 
capital inputs and projected outputs of a variety of indicators. However, since these 
legislative changes were not acted upon until November of 2010, this hybrid tiered 
priority system will have little if any influence on the 30-year history of the BETC 
program (1981-2010) evaluated in this paper.   
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
3.1. BETC Data 
 Oregon‟s BETC program is administered by the Oregon Department of Energy 
(ODOE). The data utilized in this study was obtained via a public records request from 
ODOE; this research is an independent investigation of the BETC program. This data 
documents the 20,000+ projects for which tax credits have been issued through 2010. The 
relevant fields parsed from the data set are on: 1) tax credits issued, 2) annual energy 
returns, and 3) project specifications.  
 The amount of tax credits issued by ODOE to the project developer are recorded 
in lump sum dollars ($), not adjusted for inflation. Also included in the data are projects‟ 
“final certified costs” that are eligible for funding, which are often but not always 
equivalent to total project costs. This analysis will focus only on total tax credit amount 
measured in $. 
 The energy data associated with BETC-funded projects is parsed into five 
separate classifications of energy: energy saved, energy displaced, electricity produced, 
thermal energy and biofuels produced
4
 (ODOE, 2011). Related to these are 9 fuel types, 
which include electric, natural gas, petroleum, wood, etc. The bulk of this paper focuses 
on electricity produced and energy saved under the fuel type electricity, collectively 
termed “clean electricity.” All analysis of clean electricity returns have been converted 
from million BTU to kilowatt hours (hereafter, kWh)
 5
.  
 ODOE records energy savings and generation as first year estimates for any given 
project. The “first year” designation equals the total amount of kWh generated or saved 
in the first full year of the project. This first year energy data serves as an adequate proxy 
for annual energy saved or generated over the lifetime each individual project. Since 
ODOE records annual energy returns, all energy figures will be labeled as kWh per year. 
                                                 
4
 Electricity produced, thermal energy and biofuels produced are all based on the particular type of energy 
being produced. Energy displaced means trading the energy use of one fuel for another fuel (e.g., when a 
vehicle uses an alternative fuel). Energy saved is energy no longer used (e.g., when a vehicle is no longer 
used). 
 
5
 1 million BTUs (1 MMBTU) = 293.1 kWh 
  
18 
 
This indicates that that BETC-funded projects continue to produce these annual energy 
totals on a year-to-year basis as long as the project is in operation. Notably, no data exists 
on the expected project lifetimes of BETC-funded investments. Since the data captures 
annual energy returns rather than total energy returns over the lifetime of a project, there 
is a methodological disadvantage against projects that have extended lifetimes, such as 
hydropower and geothermal projects (30 year lifetime averages, rather than 20 for most 
other sources) (ECN, 2001). This limitation in the data is addressed throughout.  
 The term energy “estimates” is used because no energy output data is recorded. 
Energy estimates are made by the project developers and then evaluated and adjusted by 
BETC technical reviewers before being finalized (ODOE, 2011). To confirm the 
accuracy of the BETC estimates, this analysis uses a sampling of real world data on 
BETC-funded projects to compare the ODOE first year energy estimates with actual 
annual energy output. Specifically, this paper uses a sample of fourteen BETC-funded 
projects—nine large wind farms, one biomass plant, and four smaller-scale photovoltaic 
projects—to assess the accuracy of ODOE estimates. The goal is to substantiate the claim 
that ODOE estimates can be utilized for meaningful evaluation of the cost efficiency and 
effectiveness of the BETC program. Ultimately, these ODOE estimates serve as a proxy 
for the real world annual energy returns of BETC-funded projects. 
 The data set also includes important fields on project specifications that are used 
to evaluate the relationship between tax credit investments and energy returns. Of 
primary importance is the project category field
6
. Project category is a broad grouping of 
clean energy projects, including wind, solar and geothermal (for a complete list of project 
categories used in this analysis, see: Table 3). More detailed cost curves that parse these 
broad categories into more specific project types are located in Appendix B.  
 Not included in the analysis are a subset of three project categories that aim for 
non-energy based outcomes: manufacturing, recycling, and RD&D (see: Table 4). 
Oregon has spent over $50 million on solar manufacturing facilities to spur the growth of 
its statewide photovoltaic industry. Similarly, almost $50 million of BETC funds have 
gone towards recycling projects, with the intention of reducing material rather than 
                                                 
6 This field is recorded as “System Name” in the ODOE data 
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energy waste. Lastly, Oregon spent over $40 million on RD&D for long-term 
technological gains rather than shorter-term clean energy delivery. 
 
Table 3: Included BETC Project Categories, with Tax Credits Received 
Project Category Tax Credits ($)
Biomass 29,880,239$       
Conservation 203,175,976$     
Geothermal 2,562,761$        
Hydro 9,757,250$        
Solar 48,576,020$       
Waste Heat Recovery 4,206,964$        
Wind 95,050,475$       
Total 393,209,685$   
Source: ODOE, 2011  
 
Table 4: Excluded BETC Project Categories, with Tax Credits Received 
Project Category Tax Credits ($)
Non-Energy Renewable Manuf. Facilities 50,998,064$       
Recycling 49,143,556$       
RD&D 14,570,696$       
RD&D - Renewable 14,065,777$       
RD&D - High Efficiency Co-Gen. 6,824,306$        
Total 135,602,399$   
Non-Elec. Transportation 87,173,738$       
Biomass 81,468,338$       
Conservation 60,609,631$       
Co-Generation - Renewable 39,457,400$       
Sustainable Building 14,051,879$       
Waste Heat Recovery 11,588,004$       
Co-Generation 5,457,724$        
Solar 1,618,742$        
Geothermal 1,328,744$        
Homebuilder Projects 160,008$           
Total 302,914,208$   
Source: ODOE, 2011  
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 This analysis focuses only on those project categories that produce or save 
electricity, which eliminates certain project categories like transportation that offset non-
electricity based fuels. Co-generation and sustainable buildings include multiple fuel 
types rather than just electricity and are thus not part of the quantitative analysis. Certain 
project categories can involve either electricity-based or non-electricity based projects, 
such as biomass. Only those projects that are electricity-based are included in the 
analysis. For a list of the non-electricity based project categories, see Table 4.   
3.2. Research Questions & Evaluation Criteria 
 The primary research question that this paper seeks to address is whether 
investment-based energy incentives are cost efficient and effective relative to 
performance-based energy incentives. This portion of the analysis evaluates the BETC 
program both for internal cost inefficiencies and in relation to current performance-based 
energy incentives in the U.S. The secondary research question asks which project 
categories are most effective and cost efficient within an investment-based energy 
incentive program. This portion of the analysis compares BETC-funded project 
categories in relation to one another over the 30-year history of the program. 
 The two evaluation criteria of effectiveness and cost efficiency are derived from 
Gan et al. (2007) and Sovacool (2010). Gan et al. define effectiveness as “the extent to 
which the policy is able to meet quantitative objectives,” which is usually “simply to 
increase the share of renewable [or clean] energy generation” (146). Sovacool (2010) 
deems a policy effective (“efficacious”) if it “has resulted in a substantial increase in the 
amount of renewable [or clean] energy generation” (p. 1785). Effectiveness will be 
measured by the total annual energy, in kWh per year, that have been correlated with the 
BETC program. Gan et al. define cost efficiency as the “the increase in green electricity 
divided by the cost of the instrument” (p. 146). Sovacool divides cost efficiency into two 
separate criteria: cost effectiveness and fiscal responsibility. Cost effectiveness refers to 
reaching energy targets at the lowest societal cost, while fiscal responsibility refers to 
limited government cost (1785). From the perspective of policymakers and the taxpaying 
public, Gan et al.‟s definition suffices for assessing the cost efficiency of the BETC 
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program. Cost efficiency is measured in public cost per annual (first year) energy unit, 
measured in dollars ($) per kWh per year. 
3.3. Modified McKinsey Cost Curves 
 This paper first investigates the cost efficiency and effectiveness of different 
project categories within the BETC program. The methodological foundation for this 
research is a cost curve derived from a series of reports published by McKinsey & 
Company, which has investigated the carbon reduction and financial potential of various 
energy technologies. Most relevantly, McKinsey & Company have used cost curves to 
assess the viability of various energy efficiency project types for achieving cost efficient 
and scalable energy returns on investment (see: Appendix A). This cost curve serves as a 
template for much of the visual data presented here.  
 The McKinsey cost curve provides two valuable pieces of information that reflect 
the two relevant criteria for evaluating the BETC program: cost efficiency and 
effectiveness. In the cost curve, the y-axis serves as an indication of cost efficiency, 
whereby the height of the column denotes the cost per unit of energy delivered. 
Technologies are ranked most to least cost efficient, from left to right. The other piece of 
information is the effectiveness of these project types based on the scalability of each. No 
single technology has the potential to scale to achieve all necessary energy needs because 
projects are bounded by time constraints and supply chain limitations. Energy efficiency 
and conservation efforts, for example, are ultimately limited in their effective potential by 
the availability of energy reduction opportunities. The width of each column x-axis on the 
cost curve indicates the energy potential of each project type.  
 The modified McKinsey cost curve used in this analysis makes significant 
substantive changes in the way that energy returns on investment are presented. 
Primarily, whereas the McKinsey and other analyses used cost curves to assess the future 
potential of energy efficiency and renewable technologies, this analysis is rooted in 
historical energy outcomes. This research relies on historical data to illuminate similar 
questions about the cost efficiency and scalability of various clean energy technologies.  
 Figure 2 provides a summary for interpreting the clean electricity cost curve used 
in this analysis. Effectiveness is measured by the total annual energy that have been 
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saved or generated by each project type. The x-axis on the cost curves represents the total 
first year energy returns by project type (measured in kWh per year). The width of each 
column signifies the amount of first year energy delivered by all BETC-funded projects 
within that category over the 30-year history of the program. Whereas the McKinsey cost 
curve investigated energy potential of certain technologies, this analysis looks at the total 
amount of energy that has been implemented historically. 
 
Figure 2: Interpreting the BETC Cost Curve 
 
  
 Cost efficiency is measured in tax cost per annually-delivered kWh. The y-axis is 
measured in dollars per kWh per year, and is the basis for organizing project categories 
from most to least cost efficient, left to right. As mentioned in the previous section, this 
annual energy approach is disadvantageous to projects that have relatively long lifetimes, 
as the energy returned over the first year becomes multiplied over a longer time period. 
The intention of the project category analysis is to tease out which groups of projects 
have provided the greatest annual return on public spending over the life of the program. 
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3.4. BETC Evaluation 
 The evaluation of the BETC program in aggregate follows a two-pronged 
approach: an assessment of project-to-project spending on clean electricity to unearth the 
scale of cost inefficiencies within the program, and then a comparison of the cost 
efficiency and effectiveness of the BETC program relative to current U.S. performance-
based energy incentive programs.  
 The first portion of this evaluation uses data on BETC-funded clean electricity 
between 2001 and 2010 to highlight avenues for achieving the same or greater clean 
electricity returns at less cost. The 10,000+ BETC-funded clean electricity projects are 
ranked from most to least cost efficient and plotted in a line graph; one line represents the 
total amount of tax credits issued and the other line represents the total amount of clean 
electricity corresponding with those credits. Since the most cost efficient projects 
correlate with greater amounts of clean electricity for less tax credits, the divergence 
between these two lines broadly summarizes the cost inefficiencies of recent clean 
electricity spending. The analysis then delves into the make-up of the most and least cost 
efficient individual projects to evaluate which technologies can be targeted to make 
investment-based energy incentives more cost efficient. 
 The second portion of this evaluation directly compares the BETC program to 
other state-level performance-based energy incentive programs around the country. Four 
technologies are isolated: solar photovoltaics (PV), biomass, hydro, and wind. A total of 
67 U.S. performance-based energy incentives have been aggregated to determine the 
average annual cost per kWh and contract length for each of these four technologies. This 
data is used to determine the total program cost per annual kWh (kWh/year). Since the 
BETC program is an upfront investment
7
, and the performance-based energy incentives 
are funded over time, a net present value calculation is performed to compare the two 
types of energy incentives on equal terms. The effectiveness of the BETC program 
relative to these performance-based energy incentives is assessed by investigating the 
relative scale of the largest programs in the sample. BETC is a state-level program, and 
                                                 
7
 BETC funding for larger projects is issued over multiple years, but BETC will be assumed to fund 
projects entirely in the first year. 
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the performance-based energy incentives range from local- or utility-level to regional-
level programs, which makes direct comparisons of effectiveness challenging. 
3.5. Sensitivity Analysis & Additionality 
 One of the essential questions that arises when evaluating the relationship 
between energy incentives and the corresponding energy returns is whether the energy 
outcomes were caused by the energy incentives. There are a host of confounding 
variables that muddle the causal line between independent variable (energy incentives) 
and dependent variable (clean energy outcomes). Confounding variables include other 
energy incentives and regulations, market conditions, time, and resource availability. This 
paper approaches one particularly salient complication in assessing the energy returns of 
the BETC program: additionality. 
 Additionality is a term rooted in the carbon offset literature, and which addresses 
the question of whether a project would have occurred anyway without a particular policy 
mechanism. Additionality takes place when a policy mechanism incurs actions that are 
not required by law, would not otherwise be financially viable, and cannot be observed in 
other similar activities that do not utilize the policy mechanism (UNFCCC, 2008).  An 
ECONorthwest study of the BETC program provides a general guideline for investigating 
additionality within the BETC program: 80% of projects would not have occurred 
without these investment-based energy incentives (2009). This analysis uses this figure as 
a baseline for teasing out the additionality impact of BETC on the various project 
categories being evaluated. 
 In this paper, the primary driver of additionality is assumed to be the payback 
period of individual projects. In this scenario, projects that have significantly longer 
payback periods are more likely to require energy incentives in order make a project 
financially viable; projects that have shorter payback periods are more likely to be 
independently financially viable without BETC funding. ODOE records a project 
payback period estimate for every project that receives BETC funding. Based on this data 
and ECONorthwest‟s 80% figure, the section removes the 20% of projects with the 
shortest payback period that are assumed to have occurred without BETC funding. Two 
of the seven wind farms (about 20%) that received the maximum tax credit available are 
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also assumed to be non-additional. Oregon‟s major wind farms have run upwards of 
hundreds of millions of dollars, and, even with a payback of over 10 years, a BETC 
incentive covering 10% of costs is intuitively less likely to lead to an additional project . 
Collectively, this sensitivity analysis offers a slightly different picture of the cost 
efficiency and effectiveness of the different BETC-funded project categories. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
4.1. Summary Statistics 
 Oregon‟s Business Energy Tax Credit (BETC) program constitutes one of the 
largest and longest-standing energy incentive programs in the U.S. Since the program‟s 
inception in 1979, over $700 million in conservation and renewable energy
8
 tax credits 
have been issued (see: Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: BETC Spending and Energy Returns by Year 
 
 These $700 million in tax credits have coincided with over 75 trillion BTUs of 
first year clean energy deployment in the form of conservation and renewable projects
9
. 
For context, the average Oregonian uses 292 million BTUs of energy per year, including 
electricity, transportation and heating; the tax credits have therefore been estimated to 
correlate with enough energy to meet the annualized individual needs of over 260,000 
                                                 
8
 Excluding Manufacturing, Recycling and RD&D 
 
9
 All BETC-funded energy outcomes are estimates of annual returns provided by the ODOE (see: section 
3.1) 
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Oregonians,
10
 or almost 10% of the state‟s energy needs (EIA, 2011). As per project 
limits and tax credit percentages increased in the latter part of the 2000‟s, program costs 
skyrocketed. Almost twice as many tax credits were issued between 2005-2010 as were 
issued in all of the 25 years preceding.  
 The Department of Energy‟s issuance of investment tax credits has historically 
been based on the meeting of certain technical requirements and project deadlines to 
achieve project funding. Over the life of the program, a significant amount of the 26,000 
applicants have been approved for tax credit subsidy (see: Table 5). Although The 
Oregonian‟s claim that ODOE approved 97% of projects is an overestimate, a significant 
majority (78%) have been approved once initiating the application process (Esteve, 
2009a; ODOE, 2011). A sizable percent have been revoked (12%) or denied (5%), while 
a smaller fraction have been withdrawn or remain inactive. It is the completed projects 
that are subject to cost efficiency and effectiveness assessment. 
 
Table 5: BETC Applications by Status 
Application Status # of Applications %
Completed 20,225 77.8%
Revoked 3,248 12.5%
Denied 1,321 5.1%
Inactive 667 2.6%
Withdrawn 492 1.9%
Rejected 42 0.2%
Grand Total 25,995 100.0%
Source: ODOE, 2011  
4.2. Verifying ODOE Estimates 
 Since the BETC program is an investment-based energy incentive program, clean 
energy projects are funded based on upfront capital costs rather than the generation or 
saving of electricity over time. ODOE records energy saved and generated for BETC-
funded projects as estimates of annual output. Before any meaningful analysis can take 
place utilizing these estimates, a verification of their accuracy needs to take place. 
                                                 
10
 Annual savings not accounting for project lifetimes, which would reduce the total annual savings from 
funded projects over time  
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 Finding good data on project output can be difficult. Using public data provided 
by the Northwest Power and Conservation Council and a local utility, this study has 
isolated real world data on fourteen BETC-funded projects: nine major wind farms, one 
biomass plant and four small business photovoltaic projects. This sample gives a rough 
snapshot of the diverse clean electricity projects that are funded under the BETC 
program. The result from this sample group of projects is that the BETC estimates hold 
up fairly accurately in relation to real world data (see: Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Comparison of BETC Estimates to Real World Energy Output 
Project Type N= MMBTU/yr. MWh/yr.
MW 
(Average) MWh/yr.
ESTIMATE-TO-
OUTPUT %
Windfarm 9 7,660,685 2,245,125 244.1* 2,138,316 95.2%
Biomass 1 177,000 51,874 6.7* 58,692 113.1%
Photovoltaics 4 3,752 1,100 1046** 95.4%
*Source: Northwest Power and Conservation Council, 2011
**Source: EWEB, 2011
BETC Source: ODOE, 2011
ANNUAL ENERGY 
ESTIMATES (BETC)
ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTPUT
 
 
 ODOE estimates of annual energy output for these fourteen projects are recorded 
in million BTU per year (MMBTU/yr.), but have been converted to megawatt hours per 
year (MWh/yr.). Real world data on the larger wind and biomass projects are recorded in 
average megawatts (MW), which is the power of these energy plants averaged over the 
course of a year (taken over multiple years of operation). These average MW numbers 
have been converted to MWh per year to compare with the BETC estimates. The actual 
energy output for the nine BETC-funded wind farms falls about 5% short of the BETC 
estimates, while the annual energy output at the biomass plant exceeded BETC estimates 
by about 15%. The real world annual energy output of the four sample photovoltaic 
projects was taken from the most recent year, recorded in MWh per year. Similar to the 
wind farms, the photovoltaic projects fell about 5% short of ODOE estimates. 
 This sampling of BETC-funded renewable electricity projects provides some 
evidence that ODOE estimates of annual energy output for BETC-funded projects are 
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accurate. Our sample suggests that real world annual energy output may fall about 5% 
below the estimates used in the remainder of this analysis. It is important to acknowledge 
that this is a small sampling of real world data and that there is no way to ensure that all 
annual energy estimates accurately reflect actual energy output. However, many of the 
conclusions from the quantitative analysis of these ODOE estimates are strong enough to 
overcome the potential for slight overestimates in the data. 
4.3. BETC Cost Curve on Clean Electricity 
 The investment-based nature of the BETC program has led to vastly different 
taxpayer investments per unit of energy returned. The basic visual tool for evaluating the 
cost efficiency and effectiveness of different project categories within the BETC program 
(wind, solar, etc.) is a cost curve of all spending on clean electricity dating back to the 
program‟s inception in 1979. Projects that reduce electricity, such as conservation, and 
those that generate electricity, such as wind power, are directly compared because both 
are measured in kWh units of clean electricity. 
 The vertical axis details the tax cost per annual kWh ($ per kWh per year) for 
each project category. This vertical axis is used to evaluate the cost efficiency of each 
project category; the cost curve is organized from most to least cost efficient, left to right. 
The horizontal axis is used to evaluate the effectiveness of each project category. This 
data is measured in annual kWh, or kWh per year, and the width of each column 
measures the total annual clean electricity deployed by each project category over the life 
of the BETC program. This data on effectiveness serves as a proxy for the ability of each 
project category to scale to future clean energy needs. The area of each rectangle is equal 
to the total tax credits in dollars ($) issued for each project category, given by multiplying 
the $ per kWh per year by the total kWh per year. 
 Figure 4 and Table 7 detail the BETC cost per annual kWh of seven clean 
electricity project categories: waste heat recovery, wind, conservation, biomass, hydro, 
geothermal and solar.  
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Figure 4: BETC Clean Electricity Cost Curve by Project Category (1981-2010) 
 
Table 7: BETC Clean Electricity by Project Category (1981-2010) 
 
  
 Immediately evident is the substantial difference in the effectiveness and cost 
efficiency of these project categories. Waste heat recovery, which involves capturing 
unused heat from industrial processes to generate electricity, is twofold the most cost 
efficient project category at $0.02 per annual kWh (i.e., a one-time taxpayer cost of $0.02 
correlates with one kWh per year for as long as the project is operational). However, 
while highly cost efficient, waste heat recovery is limited in its effectiveness. These 
projects are founded on inefficiencies within the industrial system that are rare-but-
inexpensive sources of clean electricity. Table 7 includes a column on the most recent 
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five years of BETC funding (2006-2010); the lack of any large-scale waste heat recovery 
projects over this time period suggests that the „low hanging fruit‟ of accessible waste 
heat recovery projects has been tapped. 
  Wind and conservation are both relatively cost efficient and scalable within the 
BETC program, at $0.04 and $0.06 per annual kWh, respectively. These two project 
categories collectively account for about 5.8 million of the 6.6 million annual MWh of 
clean electricity associated with the BETC program. As recipients of about three-quarters 
of all clean electricity tax credits over the last decade, wind and conservation have been 
the primary drivers of clean electricity within the BETC program. While conservation has 
been about 50% more effective than wind power, wind has been about 50% more cost 
efficient. Wind power achieved over two-thirds of the annual clean electricity of 
conservation while receiving only half as many tax credits (about $100 million versus 
$200 million, respectively). The cost efficiency of wind and conservation have remained 
steady in recent years and, thus, these technologies remain viable options within an 
investment-based energy incentive program. 
 Biomass falls between wind and conservation in terms of cost efficiency, at $0.06 
per kWh per year. Within the BETC program, biomass has received more tax credits for 
biofuel production than for electricity production, which has limited the effectiveness of 
biomass as a tool to deploy clean electricity. Also, the tax cost per annual kWh of 
biomass electricity has risen substantially in recent years, from $0.06 averaged over the 
life of the program to $0.15 over the last decade. Due to increasing demand on biomass 
for fuel production, as well as a reduction in supply of available biomass material (wood, 
organic waste, etc.), the potential for cheap biomass electricity projects is potentially 
limited. The curve thus overemphasizes the current cost efficiency of biomass for clean 
electricity production.  
 Small-scale hydro and geothermal are moderately cost efficient and effective 
within an investment-based energy incentive program.  At $0.16 and $0.21 per annual 
kWh, respectively, these technologies are about three to four times more expensive than 
wind and conservation. These project categories also have not scaled particularly well in 
the BETC program, generating about 75 GWh of electricity per year in aggregate, or 
about one seventh of that generated by biomass. Hydro power has become less cost 
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efficient in recent decades, rising to $0.22 per annual kWh; geothermal has become more 
cost efficient over recent years and is now roughly comparable to biomass ($0.19 versus 
$0.15 per annual kWh). Both hydro power and geothermal facilities can have long project 
lifetimes, of about 30 years compared to 20 years for the remaining project types, which 
gives them an advantage not captured in the cost curve (ECN, 2001). Thus, although the 
tax cost per annual kWh for hydro power and geothermal are greater than other sources, 
these technologies are likely to produce those annual kWh over a longer period of time. 
This slightly improves the cost efficiency and effectiveness of these project categories 
relative to other technologies in an investment-based energy incentive program.   
 Solar projects are neither effective nor cost efficient within the confines of the 
BETC program. Solar projects have a tax cost per annual kWh ($2.36 per kWh per year) 
over ten times that of hydro power and geothermal and over fifty times that of wind. The 
recipient of almost $50 million in tax credits, solar projects have generated roughly 20 
GWh of annual electricity. In comparison, wind projects received $100 million in tax 
credits and generated 20,000 GWh of annual electricity. Most surprisingly, the cost 
efficiency of solar projects has decreased over the last decade, despite the sustained 
technological advances that have been made in photovoltaic technology over that time 
period. Thus, it cost more public dollars per unit of solar electricity between 2006-2010 
($2.72) than it did averaged over the life of the program ($2.36). This appears to provide 
lessons both on the nature of solar as a technology and the cost efficiency of investment-
based energy incentive programs. One lesson is that solar is an expensive technology that 
still requires significant tax cost per unit of clean electricity delivered. However, the lack 
of solar cost efficiency improvements over time suggests that the upfront funding of the 
BETC program failed to incentivize the most optimal photovoltaic projects. The 
combination of expensive technology and an incentive structure based on capital costs 
rather than electrical output has hindered the cost efficiency and effectiveness of solar in 
the BETC program. 
4.4. Internal Cost Efficiency Improvements 
 The previous section suggested possible avenues for improving the cost efficiency 
of an investment-based energy incentive program by shifting funding to those project 
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categories that provide the lowest public investment per unit of energy (in kWh per year). 
This section investigates the BETC program on an individual project level to determine 
in more detail how the program could have been made more cost efficient. The broad 
lesson is that much of the clean electricity correlated with the program could have been 
achieved for less public funding. 
 Figure 5 is a summary of all tax credits issued for clean electricity projects 
between the years 2001-2010. Whereas the clean electricity cost curve evaluated BETC 
electricity returns by project category, this graph uses individual projects to tease out cost 
inefficiencies at even more granular level. There have been over 10,000 clean electricity 
projects funded by the BETC program over the 2000‟s. The funding structure of an 
investment-based energy incentive program dictates that the public investment per unit of 
clean energy fluctuates from project to project, including within a single project category. 
For example, the most cost efficient BETC-funded electricity conservation project (a 
lighting modification project in Corvallis, at $0.0002 per annual kWh) is almost 100,000 
times more cost efficient than the least cost efficient BETC-funded electricity 
conservation project (an industrial process modification project in Weston, at $19.42 per 
annual kWh). These internal variations within project categories can manifest significant 
program inefficiencies via the funding of least cost efficient projects.   
 In Figure 5, the 10,000+ BETC-funded clean electricity projects are sorted from 
most cost efficient on the left (the lowest tax cost per annual kWh, starting with the 
Corvallis project) to the least cost efficient on the right (the highest tax cost per annual 
kWh, ending with the Weston project). The blue line indicates the cumulative amount of 
tax credits that have been issued for these projects as a percentage of the total tax credits. 
Noticeable jumps in the blue line indicate larger tax credits, such as the $11 million for 
certain large wind farms (3.6% of total tax credits). The yellow line indicates the 
cumulative amount of clean electricity associated with these tax credits. The more cost 
efficient projects on the left are correlated with more clean electricity returns per tax 
credit than the less cost efficient projects on the right. The yellow line rises at a greater 
rate than the blue line because a greater percentage of annual clean electricity is deployed 
for less tax credit investment. The gap between the two lines indicates the degree to 
which cost efficient projects deployed more clean electricity for less taxpayer cost. 
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Figure 5: Electricity Saved/Generated as % of Tax Credits (2001-2010) 
 
 The figure indicates that certain projects funded by the BETC program were 
extremely cost efficient relative to the remainder of the projects. Specifically, 13.9% of 
the clean electricity tax credits were correlated with 52.1% of the program‟s annual clean 
electricity over this decade-long period (see: Figure 6). In broader terms, about 10% of 
the BETC incentives for clean electricity corresponded with half of the annual clean 
electricity returns. Receiving about $43 million of the $305 million in BETC tax credits 
for clean electricity, these projects total 2.6 annual tera-watt hours (TWh)
11
 of electricity 
generated or saved, at a one-time public cost of $0.02 per kWh per year (see: Table 8). 
For low levels of public financial input, these top 10% most cost efficient projects were 
correlated with a substantial amount of the total clean electricity associated with the 
program.  
                                                 
11
 1,000,000,000 kWh = 1,000,000 MWh = 1,000 GWh = 1TWh 
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Figure 6: Electricity Saved/Generated as % of Tax Credits (2001-2010) v2 
 
Table 8: Summary by Cost Efficiency Grouping 
Cost Efficiency 
Grouping Program Cost MWh/Yr.
Program Cost 
/kWh/Yr.
Top 10% $42,500,925 2,579,869 $0.02
Next 40% $108,524,055 1,923,333 $0.06
Bottom 50% $154,105,479 449,197 $0.34
Total $305,130,459 4,952,399 $0.06
Source: ODOE, 2011  
  
 49.5% of the most cost efficient BETC-funded clean electricity projects were 
correlated with 90.9% of the annual clean electricity during this time period. Or, about 
half of BETC incentives for clean electricity between 2001-2010 corresponded with all 
but 10% of the total clean electricity delivered. This suggests that, in addition to the very 
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cost efficient projects, there are another subset of projects (the “next 40%” in Table 8) 
that are moderately cost efficient recipients of BETC funds. These projects represent the 
“average” use of BETC spending, in that 1% of the tax credits are correlated with about 
1% of corresponding clean electricity returns. These projects received $109 million in 
BETC funding and delivered 1.9 annual TWh of clean electricity, at about the BETC 
average for clean electricity of $0.06 per kWh per year.  
 These statistics also suggest that there are a significant amount of cost inefficient 
projects as well: the 50% least cost efficient tax credits are correlated with only 10% of 
the annual electricity savings and generation over this timeframe. $150 million in BETC 
funding corresponded with about one half TWh of annual clean electricity, at a rate of 
$0.34 per kWh per year. The retrospective lesson is that the BETC program could have 
derived a substantial portion of the electricity obtained by the program at half of the cost. 
 In order to understand the make-up of the most and least cost efficient individual 
projects, Figure 7 shows the project category ratio in the each segment of cost efficiency 
(top 10%, next 40% and bottom 50%). The lessons learned parallel much of what was 
gathered from the clean electricity cost curve. The top 10% most cost efficient individual 
projects are made up of 4 project categories: conservation, solar, wind and waste heat 
recovery. Wind and waste heat recovery have a significant fraction of their total projects 
in the top 10%. Conservation and, surprisingly, solar, have a small percentage of their 
projects in the top 10%. By retaining only these most 10% most cost efficient clean 
electricity projects, 50% of the total clean electricity in the BETC program could have 
been achieved. 
 Collectively, the top 10% and the next 40% of cost efficient projects are made up 
of all seven clean electricity technologies, although in varying degrees. This suggests 
that, within the BETC programs, projects of all types have been part of the high- and 
mid-range cost efficient projects that have made up the bulk of BETC annual clean 
electricity delivery. Half or more of the biomass, wind, and waste heat recovery projects 
fall into the top 50%. Conservation is heavily represented, followed by a smaller fraction 
of the moderately cost efficient geothermal and hydro power technologies. Solar, while 
present in the top 50% most cost efficient projects, is largely captured in the least cost 
efficient BETC-funded projects. By retaining only these top 50% most cost efficient 
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projects, 90% of the clean electricity correlated with the BETC program could have been 
achieved. Or, from another perspective, a doubling in funding for projects akin to the 
50% most cost efficient could have achieved an 80% increase in the clean electricity 
delivered (90% of clean electricity + 90% = 180% of annual clean electricity 
deployment). 
 
Figure 7: Project Category Breakdown, by Cost Efficiency Grouping 
 
 
 The broader policy lesson is twofold. Firstly, investment-based energy incentive 
programs can be reformed to better account for these vastly diverging electricity returns 
on public investment. Section 4.3 outlined the divergence in tax cost per electricity return 
on a project category level, highlighting the technologies that can achieve the optimal 
clean electricity returns on public investment. This section explored cost inefficiencies 
within the program at an even more detailed level and found that certain individual 
projects are far more cost efficient than others. Although these cost efficiencies largely 
parallel those gleamed from the clean electricity cost curve, it is clear that there is a role 
for all technologies in optimizing clean electricity output. The goal should be to both 
0% 50% 100%
Wind
Waste Heat …
Solar
Hydro
Geothermal
Conservation
Biomass
% of Project Type in Each Tier
Top 10% Next 40% Bottom 50%
Source: ODOE, 2011
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emphasize cost efficient technologies and to incentivize the most cost efficient projects 
within each category. Solar, for example, while generally expensive, is also represented 
in the top 10% most cost efficient projects for delivering clean electricity in the BETC 
program. Second, these statistics may suggest that inefficiencies are embedded in the 
BETC program because of the funding structure of investment-based energy incentives 
more broadly. By funding capital investment rather than energy output, BETC funds both 
cost efficient and cost inefficient projects alike. To evaluate the cost efficiency of the 
BETC program as a whole, the next section compares the total program tax cost per kWh 
per year against other statewide performance-based energy incentive programs. 
4.5. Comparing BETC to Performance-Based Energy Incentives 
 The previous sections have used internal spending patterns within the BETC 
program to evaluate the cost efficiency and effectiveness of different patterns of BETC 
spending. The significant cost efficiency disparities of individual projects called into 
question, but did not negate, the cost efficiency of the program as a whole. The lesson 
was more about the ability to make incentive-based energy incentives more cost efficient 
and effective, rather than evaluating these energy incentives as a whole. This section 
investigates the relative cost efficiency and effectiveness of investment-based energy 
incentives by comparing the BETC program against a sample of performance-based 
energy incentives from around the U.S. 
 Performance-based energy incentives tend to exist only for renewable electricity 
generation, so this section narrows the analysis to include only four sources of renewable 
electricity: solar photovoltaics (PV), biomass, hydro power and wind. There are a 
scattering of performance-based energy incentives for geothermal, but not enough to 
merit a full analysis. In all, the Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy 
(DSIRE) contains 67 performance-based energy incentive policies spread amongst the 
four technology types. Any regional-, state- , local- or utility-level policy was included if 
the database included information on: a) qualifying technologies; b) dollars incentive per 
kWh; and c) contract term length. Although not all confounding variables are addressed 
directly (other renewable energy policies, resources availability, etc.), the regional 
diversity of the energy incentives counteracts much of the potential systemic influence of 
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external variables. Using this sample of programs, dollars per kWh and contract term 
lengths were averaged for each of the four technologies (see: Table 9). An average total 
program cost per annual kWh was determined for each of these technologies by 
multiplying the annual program cost by the contract term length. Information on the size 
of each program, as a proxy for effectiveness, is included in some but not all of the 
performance-based energy incentive programs (addressed later in this section). 
 
Table 9: Aggregated Performance-Based Cost Per Annual kWh 
Annual Program 
Cost/                        
kWh/yr. Terms (Years)
Total Program Cost/  
kWh/yr. 
(Undiscounted)
PV Average $0.22 12.7 $2.79
Biomass Average $0.18 10.3 $1.88
Hydro Average $0.17 13.9 $2.40
Wind Average $0.17 12.7 $2.10
Total Average $0.19 12.4 $2.38
Source: DSire, 2011
  
 The BETC program cost per kWh per year for each of these four project 
categories is included in Table 10. The only significant changes in these figures from the 
previous section is for solar PV, which is significantly less cost efficient when solar water 
heating projects are removed ($3.29 per annual kWh for PV versus $2.36 per annual kWh 
including solar water heating). Table 9 and the BETC data from Table 10 are measured in 
total program cost per kWh per year (i.e., total program cost per kWh delivered every 
year that the project remains in operation). Performance-based energy incentives have the 
advantage of guaranteeing that the projects remain in operation over the lifetime of the 
contract, which can range upwards of 20-25 years. However, the average contact length 
for these four technologies is 12.4 years, which is well within the range of assumed 
project lifetimes for renewable electricity projects (ECN, 2001). In order to compare the 
BETC program with the aggregated performance-based energy incentive programs, both 
must be put into net present value terms. 
 The BETC program is assumed to be an upfront cost, and therefore is already in 
net present value terms. In order to equalize this upfront cost with performance-based 
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energy incentives, which are paid out over multiple years, a 6% discount rate is applied to 
future year spending over the contract length of each technology (see: Appendix C). The 
result is a decrease in the program cost of the performance-based energy incentive 
programs when put into net present value terms (see: Table 10). Both the BETC and the 
performance-based energy incentive figures are in total net present value program cost 
per kWh per year. 
 
Table 10: Total Program Cost Efficiency Comparison, Net Present Value 
BETC Program 
Cost/              
kwh/yr.
Performance-Based 
Program Cost/  
kWh/yr.                      
(Discounted at 6%)
Solar PV $3.29 $2.03
Biomass $0.07 $1.43
Hydro $0.22 $1.69
Wind $0.04 $1.53
Total $0.06 $1.55
Source: ODOE, 2011  
  
 The cost efficiency of the BETC program is evident for biomass, hydro and wind 
technology. Historical data on the BETC program concludes that biomass electricity has 
had a tax cost of $0.07 per kWh per year. In the aggregated performance-based energy 
incentive programs, that same kWh per year has a net present value program cost of 
$1.43. Although biomass projects have become less cost efficient in recent years in the 
BETC program (about $0.15 per kWh per year), the technology still holds a cost 
efficiency advantage over the same technology in these other program. Hydro power is 
similarly cost efficient, at $0.22 per annual kWh within the BETC program versus $1.69 
per annual kWh in the aggregated performance based energy incentive programs.  
 Wind is particularly cost efficient, at a onetime tax cost of $0.04 per kWh per year 
compared to $1.53 per kWh per year averaged over the performance-based energy 
incentive programs. Under the BETC program, Oregon‟s nine largest wind farms 
received $83 million in tax credits (see: Table 11). Based on real world data obtained 
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from Northwest Power and Conservation Council, these nine wind farms have 
collectively averaged 244 MW of power over the latter part of the 2000‟s. A simple 
conversion nets over 2.1 TWh of annual electricity generated by these wind farms. The 
BETC program‟s $83 million correlated with 2.1 TWh of annual electricity equates to a 
program cost of $0.039 per kWh per year. 
 
Table 11: Cost Efficiency of BETC's Nine Largest Wind Farms 
Tax Credits ($) MW (Average)* kWh/yr.
Program Cost      
/kWh/yr.
83,000,000$       244 2,138,316,000 0.039$              
Source: ODOE, 2011
*Power plant energy output data comes from the Northwest Power and 
Conservation Council  
  
 In comparison, Indianapolis Light & Power Company offer $0.107 per kWh of 
wind electricity over 10 years. At this program cost of $1.07 per kWh per year, Oregon‟s 
nine largest wind farms would have had a tax cost of $2.3 billion. Only Duke Energy‟s 
performance-based energy incentive is comparable to the BETC program‟s large wind 
farms, at $0.006 per kWh over 10 years ($0.06 program cost per kWh per year). These 
nine wind farms would have had a tax cost of $128 million under the incentive structure 
of the Duke Energy program. For a list of the performance-based energy incentives used 
in this assessment, see: Appendix D. 
 Solar PV in the BETC program is less cost efficient than in this sample of 
performance-based energy incentive programs. At a tax cost per annual kWh of $3.29, 
BETC has program cost over 50% higher per annual kWh than in the aggregated 
performance-based energy incentives (net present value of $2.03 per annual kWh). The 
nearly $50 million in tax credits for solar PV in the BETC program would have generated 
more clean electricity under the incentive structure of these other programs. Overall, the 
BETC program, as a case study of investment-based energy incentives, can be said to be 
at least moderately cost efficient in relation to current U.S. energy incentive policies. 
Even accounting for the potentially slight overestimates of the ODOE data, and the fact 
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that BETC funding does not guarantee long-term project operation, the historical data 
suggests that the program has cost efficiently delivered biomass, hydro and wind 
facilities in relation to this sample of performance-based energy incentives. The 
significant difference in cost efficiency allows for a large margin of error when forming 
this conclusion. 
 It is more difficult to assess the effectiveness of the BETC program in relation to 
these performance-based energy incentives. Many of the sample programs are recent, 
including pilot programs, while others are locally- or utility-based. However, a surface-
level comparison of the BETC program to the largest performance-based energy 
incentive programs highlights the large amount of electricity correlated with the BETC 
program (see: Table 12). The BETC program‟s largest project was the equivalent of 130 
MW, far greater than any project limit in the sample of large performance-based energy 
incentive programs. The BETC program has also averaged about 160 MW of grid-
connected nameplate capacity per year over the last ten years. This is greater than most of 
the other programs aim to deliver over the course of their multi-year funding periods. The 
simple lesson is that BETC and investment-based energy incentive programs can be an 
effective driver of clean energy relative to performance-based energy incentives. 
 
Table 12: Effectiveness Comparison Against Large Performance-Based Programs 
Program Name Tech.*
Project Limit 
(Nameplate kW)
Program Limit 
(Nameplate MW)
TVA - Mid-Sized Standard Offer Program  B, H, S, W 20,000 100
TVA - Generation Partners Program B, H, S, W 200 200
Vermont Standard Offer Program B, H, S 2,200 50
Biomass Energy Prod. Incentive (S. Carolina) B 1,000 21
Community Based RE Prod. Incentive (Maine) B, H, S, W 10,000 50
Large Performance-Based Program Avg. 6,680 84.2
BETC (Annual)** B, H, S, W 130,625 161.7
*B=Biomass, H=Hydro, S=Solar, W=Wind
**Converted from kWh to kW Based on 32% Capacity Factor
Source: Dsire, 2011; ODOE, 2011
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4.6. Sensitivity Analysis & Additionality 
 One assumption implicit in the comparison of BETC to performance-based 
energy incentives is that all policies are subject to equal considerations of additionality. 
The assumption is that there is no difference between the influence of investment-based 
energy incentives and performance-based energy incentives on the decision making 
process, only the total subsidy available. Thus, each policy is equally likely to subsidize 
non-additional projects that would have occurred without the energy incentive. 
Evaluating this assumption in more detail is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
 However, this analysis attempts to account for the varying impacts of 
additionality on project categories within the BETC program. The rationale is that certain 
project categories are more likely to be independently viable without BETC incentive 
funding, and are thus more likely to be non-additional projects that would have occurred 
without energy incentives. Additionality is notoriously difficult to isolate: of the 20,000+ 
projects funded over the 30-year history of the BETC program, which projects would 
have been developed independent of these energy incentives? In order to approach this 
question, this assessment will assume that non-additionality is rooted in the financial 
viability of individual projects. The assumption will be that those projects most likely to 
be non-additional are those that have the shortest payback periods according to ODOE 
data recorded at the time of project funding. 
 ECONorthwest estimates that 80% of BETC-funded projects would not have 
occurred without these investment tax credits (2009). Reversely, 20% of projects would 
have been deployed regardless of BETC incentives. These are the non-additional projects 
that this analysis seeks to remove. BETC-funded projects differ substantially in the 
payback period on investment, from under 1 year to more than 99 years. Using the 20% 
non-additional figure as a starting point, this sensitivity analysis removes the 20% of 
projects with the lowest payback periods and re-assesses the cost efficiency of each 
technology. 
 The 20% lowest project payback periods are those projects that recoup investment 
in under 4.3 years. Any project with a payback period of greater than 4.3 years will be 
assumed to be additional. Also included in the non-additional group are 20% of large 
wind farms, despite their average of 10 year payback periods. The rationale is that these 
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projects range upwards in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and are thus less likely to 
rely on BETC funding to green light their projects. No other clean electricity project 
category was eligible for a maximum credit of $10 million. 
 The resulting table (Table 13) has two major changes that highlight the potential 
impact of additionality on the cost efficiency of the respective project categories. 
Conservation increases from $0.06 to $0.09 per kWh per year when the 20% least 
payback period projects are removed. This is equivalent to a 50% reduction in cost 
efficiency of conservation as a project category. The lesson is that many conservation 
projects pay themselves off over a shorter period of time and are more likely not to have 
needed BETC funding; the remaining conservation projects more accurately reflect the 
cost of additional projects. The impact on biomass is even more significant: a five-fold 
cost efficiency reduction from $0.06 to $0.31 per annual kWh suggests that non-
additional biomass projects artificially increase the perceived cost efficiency of these 
projects. Many biomass projects within the BETC program have a very low payback 
period, and when these projects are removed biomass looks less attractive than 
moderately-cost efficient project categories like hydro and geothermal. Surprisingly, this 
sensitivity analysis does not affect wind, which remains both cost efficient and effective. 
 
Table 13: Senstitivity Analysis for Additionality 
Project Category
Total Program 
Cost ($)
Annual Energy 
(MWh/yr.)
Program Cost/            
kWh/yr.         
(Adjusted)
Program Cost/   
kWh/yr.                 
(Unadjusted)
Waste Heat Recovery 3,789,701$       169,385 0.02$                0.02$                
Wind 73,050,475$     1,748,792 0.04$                0.04$                
Conservation 167,050,699$    1,826,150 0.09$                0.06$                
Hydro 9,695,202$       60,367 0.16$                0.16$                
Geothermal 2,464,875$       11,113 0.22$                0.21$                
Biomass 14,370,731$     46,744 0.31$                0.06$                
Solar 48,530,604$     19,706 2.46$                2.36$                
Total 318,952,287$    3,882,256 0.08$                0.06$                
Source: ODOE, 2011  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 In investigating the cost efficiency and effectiveness of different project 
categories within an investment-based energy incentive program, it is clear that there are 
avenues for improvement. Wind and conservation offer low cost, scalable technologies 
that can drive significant amounts of clean electricity at a low public cost per unit of 
energy delivered. These technologies have remained cost efficient well into the 2000‟s. 
Biomass, and particularly waste heat recovery, are cost efficient niche clean electricity 
options that should be considered when applicable. Waste heat recovery has not been 
effective over recent years, and biomass has become less cost efficient over time. Both of 
these characteristics limit the ability of these project categories to be primary targets for 
sizable clean electricity deployment. Hydro and geothermal power are moderately cost 
efficient, and offer other advantages such as longer project lifetimes relative to other 
project categories. These technologies may be somewhat limited in their ability to 
effectively scale, based on the low quantity of clean electricity delivered compared to 
other technologies. Solar is an expensive technology that has been neither cost efficient 
nor effective within the BETC program. Most strikingly, the tax cost per annual kWh for 
solar power has increased over the course of the decade, which suggests that solar does 
not perform well in an investment-based energy incentive program. Over-reliance on 
solar funding can overwhelm an incentive program and remove much needed funding for 
more cost efficient and effective technologies. 
 There is significant opportunity for cost efficiency improvements on a project-to-
project level within the BETC program. Roughly 10% of BETC incentives for clean 
electricity are correlated with 50% of annual clean electricity returns, and 50% of BETC 
incentives are correlated with 90% of annual clean electricity returns over the last decade. 
The incentive structure of an investment-based program such as BETC is going to fund 
cost efficient and cost inefficient projects equally. The result is that certain projects 
produce far greater clean energy returns at less cost compared to other projects. In order 
to optimize the cost efficiency of the program, BETC funding should target the most cost 
efficient projects within each technology. All project categories have individual projects 
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that fall within the top 50% of cost efficient clean electricity projects funded between 
2001-2010. This suggests that cost efficiency criteria can be utilized to fund those 
projects with the greatest electricity returns on investment—ODOE has already moved to 
considering cost efficiency, amongst other criteria, in its funding decisions. One strategy 
is to screen projects so that the 50% least cost efficient projects do not receive BETC 
funding, which would have saved about $150 million of public funds over the last 
decade. Another strategy is to use those funds to redouble clean energy efforts, and target 
a balance of technologies based on cost efficiency to significantly increase the total clean 
electricity associated with the BETC program. 
 Despite these cost inefficiencies in the historical spending patterns of the BETC 
program, Oregon‟s public energy spending holds up well against a sample of 
performance-based energy incentives from around the U.S. For biomass, hydro power, 
and wind, BETC energy incentives are more cost efficient than relative performance-
based energy incentive programs. Wind, in particular, requires much less total program 
cost per kWh per year than in comparable performance-based energy incentive programs; 
Oregon‟s nine large wind farms would have required significantly more public spending 
under the incentive structure of these other regional- and utility-based programs. Solar 
PV is the exception to the cost efficiency of the BETC program, requiring over 50% more 
cost per annual kWh than comparable programs. The lesson for other policymakers is that 
non-PV technologies, such as biomass and wind, may require less funding per kWh in a 
performance-based energy incentive program than is currently available. 
 The BETC program has undoubtedly been an effective driver of clean electricity 
in Oregon. Assuming that 80% of projects would not have occurred without BETC 
funding (ECONW, 2009), most of the substantial changes in the statewide clean energy 
landscape can be attributed to the BETC program. The challenge has been sustaining this 
effectiveness over a long period of time—a common critique of investment tax credits. 
Investment-based energy incentives require a significant amount of upfront public cost, 
which can make the programs more financially burdensome in the short-term than 
performance-based energy incentive programs. Thus, even a cost efficient program like 
BETC can become unsustainable if the scale of public spending becomes too large. 
Recent controversies over the BETC program and upcoming legislative changes likely to 
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reduce its clean energy impacts suggest that effectiveness can be a double-edged sword. 
While driving significant amounts of renewable energy and conservation projects is a 
favorable policy goal, the extent of these goals are ultimately limited by the availability 
of public funds and political support. While more cost efficient than the sample of 
performance-based energy incentive programs, the scale and upfront incentive structure 
of the BETC program have threatened to derail its success. 
 There are limitations to this analysis that should be considered. Assessing energy 
incentive programs and project categories based on clean energy returns is a 
simplification of the broader policy goals surrounding energy in the 21
st
 century. Energy 
returns are only one of many available indicators that should be considered when making 
an energy-related policy decision. Also relevant are considerations of green jobs that can 
be created or sustained, the community ownership potential of these technologies, and the 
development of a diverse array of project categories rather than a singular technological 
focus. Recent experience with wind in Oregon highlights the importance of jobs as an 
area of political focus during economic stagnation; major wind farms create large 
amounts of clean electricity but few permanent jobs (Esteve, 2011). Wind electricity is 
also more complex than a simple kWh designation would indicate: there have been many 
challenges in the Pacific Northwest matching off-peak wind generation with the periods 
when people need electricity the most. Biomass has had its share of controversy as well, 
for the localized pollution and harmful ecosystem effects that it incurs. An assessment of 
tax cost per energy unit tells an important, but ultimately incomplete, side of the story. 
 More research needs to be done on the economic valuation of these different 
energy sources in Oregon and the Pacific Northwest. The external costs of biomass 
should be calculated and included in the per kWh cost of electricity whenever project 
decisions are made. More information is also needed on the impact of the time-of-day 
when electricity is delivered. How much of an impact does wind‟s intermittency have on 
the cost per unit electricity versus the peak availability of a solar PV array? Energy 
systems need cost efficient kWh, but also certain kinds of cost efficient kWh that 
incorporate these other factors into the true cost of every unit of energy. More studies 
need to be done to substantiate the economic impacts of these factors so that more 
informed energy policy decisions can be made.  
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 Lastly, it is important that energy incentives are focused on the long-term shift 
towards more a sustainable energy system in the Pacific Northwest. Uncertain and stop-
start energy policy hinders the region‟s ability to foster sustained development of 
renewable energy and conservation industry. The relative cost efficiency of the BETC 
program shows that investment-based energy incentive programs work, but they require a 
significant amount of financial sacrifice in the short-term to achieve larger energy policy 
goals. Energy incentives are an investment in the many economic, social, and ecological 
benefits of clean energy proliferation. Stability, along with cost efficiency and 
effectiveness, needs to be harnessed to achieve these benefits of clean energy well into 
the 21
st
 century.
  
 
49 
 
APPENDIX A 
MCKINSEY COST CURVE 
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APPENDIX B  
DETAILED BETC COST CURVES 
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APPENDIX C 
NET PRESENT VALUE CALCULATION 
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APPENDIX D 
PERFORMANCE-BASED ENERGY INCENTIVES 
Program Name Tech.
Annual 
Program 
Cost/       
kWh/yr.)
Terms 
(Years)
Total 
Program 
Cost/           
kWh/yr. Notes
NJ Board of Public Utilities (SRECs*)   PV $0.60 15 $9.00
OR Pilot Solar Volumetric Incentive Rate PV $0.41 15 $6.21 Averaged
Gainesville Regional Utilities - Solar FIT PV $0.29 20 $5.70 Averaged
TVA - Mid-Sized RE Standard Offer PV $0.56 15 $8.42
3% annual increase, 
Averaged
D.C. Public Service Commission (SRECs) PV $0.38 $4.84 Varies
Hawaii Feed-in Tariff PV $0.20 20 $4.08 Averaged
MD Public Service Commission (SRECs) PV $0.33 $4.20 Varies
DE Public Service Commission (SRECs) PV $0.31 $3.95 Varies
Golden Valley Electric Association (AK) PV $0.30 $3.82 Varies
Massachusetts DOER (SRECs)  PV $0.30 $3.82 Varies
Indianapolis Power & Light Co. PV $0.22 10 $2.20 Averaged
Illinois Solar Energy Association (SRECs) PV $0.20 $2.55
Farmers Electric Cooperative (IA) PV $0.20 10 $2.00
Progress Energy Carolinas PV $0.18 $2.29
El Paso Electric Company (SRECs) PV $0.14 12 $1.65 Averaged
TVA - Generation Partners Program PV $0.12 10 $1.20 Also $1000 Credit
California Feed-In Tariff PV $0.12 17.5 $2.01 Averaged
Marin Clean Energy - Feed-In Tariff  PV $0.11 15 $1.67 Averaged
Community Based RE Prod. Incentive (ME) PV $0.10 $1.27 Varies
NC GreenPower Production Incentive PV $0.10 $1.27
PNM - Performance-Based Solar PV (NM) PV $0.09 16 $1.44 Averaged
Xcel Energy - Solar*Rewards (NM) PV $0.11 11 $1.16 Averaged
EWEB - Solar Electric Program PV $0.09 10 $0.90 Averaged
Georgia Power - Solar Buyback Program   PV $0.17 5 $0.85
Orlando Utilities Commission - Pilot Solar  PV $0.05 5 $0.25
Duke Energy - Standard Purchase (NC/SC) PV $0.03 10 $0.30 Varies
PV Average $0.22 12.7 $2.96
TVA - Mid-Sized RE Standard Offer Bio. $0.56 15 $8.42 3% Annual Increase
Xcel Energy - RE Buy-Back Rates  (WI) Bio. $0.73 10 $7.30
WA Renewable Energy Prod. Incentives  Bio. $0.33 $3.39 Averaged
Golden Valley Electric Association (AK) Bio. $0.30 $3.08 Varies
Chelan County PUD (Washington) Bio. $0.22 $2.26
Vermont Standard Offer Bio. $0.12 17.5 $2.01 Averaged
We Energies - Biogas Buy-Back Rate Bio. $0.11 $1.11 Averaged
Community Based RE Prod. Incentive (ME) Bio. $0.10 $1.03
Okanogan County PUD (Washington) Bio. $0.10 $1.03
Indianapolis Power & Light Co. Bio. $0.09 10 $0.85 Also $6.18/kW/mo.
TVA - Generation Partners Program Bio. $0.03 10 $0.30 Also $1000 Credit  
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Program Name Tech.
Annual 
Program 
Cost/       
kWh/yr.)
Terms 
(Years)
Total 
Program 
Cost/           
kWh/yr. Notes
CVPS - Biomass Electricity Prod. Incentive   Bio. 0.04 5 $0.20
Minnesota - RE Production Incentive   Bio. $0.01 10 $0.13 Averaged
Duke Energy - Standard Purchase (NC/SC) Bio. $0.01 10 $0.06
Biomass Energy Production Incentive (SC) Bio. $0.01 5 $0.05
Biomass Average $0.18 10.3 $2.08
Chelan County PUD (Washington) Geo. $0.22 $2.20
Duke Energy - Standard Purchase (NC/SC) Geo. $0.01 10 $0.06
Geothermal Average $0.11 10 $1.13
Hawaii Feed-in Tariff Hydro $0.20 21 $4.22 Average
Vermont Standard Offer Hydro $0.12 17.5 $2.15
Orcas Power & Light - Prod. Incentive (WA) Hydro $1.50 First Year Payment
TVA - Generation Partners Program Hydro $0.03 10 $0.30 Also $1000 Credit
TVA - Mid-Sized RE Standard Offer Hydro $0.56 15 $8.42 3% Annual Increase
Golden Valley Electric Association (AK) Hydro $0.30 $4.18 Varies
Community Based RE Prod. Incentive (ME) Hydro $0.10 $1.00
Minnesota - RE Production Incentive   Hydro $0.01 10 $0.13 Averaged
Duke Energy - Standard Purchase (NC/SC) Hydro $0.01 10 $0.06
Chelan County PUD (WA) Hydro $0.22 $4.40
Hydro Average $0.17 13.9 $2.23
TVA - Generation Partners Program Wind $0.03 10 $0.30 Also $1000 Credit
TVA - Mid-Sized RE Standard Offer Wind $0.56 15 $8.42
3% Annual Increase, 
Averaged
Golden Valley Electric Association (AK) Wind $0.30 $3.82 Varies
Hawaii Feed-in Tariff Wind $0.15 20 $3.00 Averaged
Indianapolis Power & Light Co. Wind $0.11 10 $1.07
Farmers Electric Cooperative (Iowa) Wind $0.20 10 $2.00
Community Based RE Prod. Incentive (ME) Wind $0.10 $1.27
El Paso Electric Company (SRECs) (NM) Wind $0.05 12 $0.65
Duke Energy - Standard Purchase (NC/SC) Wind $0.01 10 $0.06
NC GreenPower Production Incentive Wind $0.09 $1.15
Vermont Standard Offer Wind $0.17 17.5 $2.92
Chelan County PUD (Washington) Wind $0.22 $2.80
Okanogan County PUD (Washington) Wind $0.10 $1.27
Orcas Power & Light - Prod. Incentive (WA) Wind $1.50 First Year Payment
Washington RE Production Incentives  Wind $0.33 $4.20 Averaged
Xcel Energy - RE Buy-Back Rates (WI) Wind $0.07 10 $0.66
Wind Average $0.17 12.7 $2.19
Total Average $0.17 12.1 $2.26
*SREC = Solar Renewable Energy Credits $0.19 $12.37 $2.53
Source: Dsire, 2011; HECO, 2011; CPUC, 2011; Marin Clean Energy, 2011
  
56 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
 
Arrow, K. (1962). “The economic implications of learning-by-doing.” Review of 
Economic Studies, 29, 155-173. 
 
Barradale, M. J. (2010).  "Impact of public policy uncertainty on renewable energy 
investment: wind power and the production tax credit." Energy Policy 38 (12), 
7698-709. 
 
Bird, L., Bolinger, M., Gagliano, T., Wiser, R., Brown, M., Parsons, B. (2005). “Policies 
and market factors driving wind power development in the United States.” Energy 
Policy 33, 1397-1407. 
 
The Breakthrough Institute. (2009). Case studies in American innovation: A new look at 
government involvement in technological development. 
 
California Public Utility Commission (CPUC). (2011). “Feed-in tariff price.” 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/Feed-in+Tariff+Price.htm 
 
Caney, S. (2005). “Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility, and global climate change.” 
Leiden Journal of International Law 18, 747-775. 
 
Cox, A. J., Blumstein, C.J. & Gilbert., R.J. (1991). “Wind power in California: A case 
study of targeted tax subsidies.” In Gilbert, R.J., Regulatory Choices: A 
Perspective on Developments in Energy Policy (347-375). Berkeley: University of 
California. 
 
Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE). (2011). 
“Incentives/policies for renewables & efficiency.” http://www.dsireusa.org/ 
 
Duin, S. (2010, February 10) "Oregon's BETC debacle: Nobody's sorry, responsible or 
taking the fall." The Oregonian. 
 
ECONorthwest. (2009). Economic impacts of Oregon energy tax credits in 2007 and 
2008 (BETC/RETC): Final report: Prepared for the Oregon Department of 
Energy. 
 
Eilperin, J. (2009, May 02). “New analysis brings dire forecast of 6.3-degree temperature 
increase.” Washington Post. 
 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2011). “State energy profiles.” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/  
 
  
  
57 
 
Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN). (2001). Renewable energy burden 
sharing (REBUS): Effects of burden sharing and certificate trade on the 
renewable electricity market in Europe. 
 
Esteve, H. (2009a, October 31). "State lowballed cost of green tax breaks." The 
Oregonian. 
 
Esteve,, H. (2009b, December 29). "Walmart, others make money on Oregon's energy tax 
credits." The Oregonian. 
 
Esteve, H. (2011, March 14). “Despite rocketing costs, Oregon lawmakers leery of 
ending green energy subsidies.” The Oregonian. 
 
European Environment Agency (EEA). (2004). Energy subsidies in the European Union: 
A brief overview. 
 
Gardiner, S.M. (2006). “A perfect moral storm: Climate change, intergovernmental ethics 
and the problem of moral corruption.” Environmental Values 15 (3), 397-413. 
 
Gan, L., Eskeland, G.S. & Kolshus, H. H. (2007). "Green electricity market development: 
Lessons from Europe and the US." Energy Policy 35 (1), 144-55. 
 
Global Humanitarian Forum (GHF). (2009). Climate change humanitarian report: The 
anatomy of a silent crisis. 
 
Haas, R., Eichammer, W., Huber, C., Langniss, O., Lorenzoni, A., Madlener, 
R.,…Verbruggen, A. (2004). “How to promote renewable energy systems 
successfully and effectively.” Energy Policy 32, 833-839.  
 
Hardin, G. (1968). “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162, 1243-1248. 
 
Hassett, K.A. & Metcalf, G.E. (2006). “What would a rational energy policy look like?” 
Tax Analysts Special Supplement on Energy, 89-92. 
 
Hawaiian Electric Company (HECO). (2011). “HECO Feed-in tariff program.” 
http://www.heco.com/portal/site/heco/menuitem.508576f78baa14340b4c0610c51
0b1ca/?vgnextoid=0b0a8618ce4f7210VgnVCM1000005c011bacRCRD&vgnextc
hannel=3220894ba55bb210VgnVCM1000005c011bacRCRD&vgnextfmt=default
&vgnextrefresh=1&level=0&ct=article 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA). (2011). "Global renewable energy policies and 
measures database." http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=re 
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2007). Climate change 2007: 
Synthesis report summary for policymakers. 
 
  
58 
 
Keuhl, G. J. (2010). “Oregon‟s big gamble: BETC and the economics of renewable 
energy and conservation.” Oregon Law Review 89, 701-724. 
 
Liao, C., Ou, H., Lo, S., Chiueh, P., Yu, Y. (2011). "A challenging approach for 
renewable energy market development." Renewable & Sustainable Energy 
Reviews 15 (1), 787-93. 
 
Loiter, J. & Norberg-Bohm, V. (1999). “Technology policy and renewable energy: Public 
roles in the development of new energy technologies.” Energy Policy 27, 85-97. 
 
Mann, R. A. (2010). “Back to the future: Recommendations and predictions for greener 
tax policy.” Oregon Law Review 88, 355-404. 
 
Marin Energy Authority. (2011). “Feed-in tariff for distributed renewable generation.” 
http://www.marincleanenergy.info/images/stories/PDF/MCE_FIT.pdf 
 
McKinsey & Company. (2009). Unlocking energy efficiency in the U.S. economy. 
 
Menz, F.C. (2005). “Green electricity policies in the United States: Case study.” Energy 
Policy 33, 2398-2410. 
 
Menz, F.C.. & Vachon, S. (2006). “The effectiveness of different policy regimes for 
promoting wind power: Experiences from the States.” Energy Policy 34, 1786-
1796. 
 
Metcalf, G. E. (2009). "Tax policies for low-carbon technologies." National Tax Journal 
62 (3), 519-33. 
 
Oregon Blue Book. (2011). “Government Finance: State Government.” 
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/govtfinance/govtfinance01.htm 
 
Oregon Department of Energy (ODOE). (2009). Temporary rules filed on Business 
Energy Tax Credit program. 
 
Oregon Department of Energy (ODOE). (2010). Business Energy Tax Credits. 2010. 
 
Oregon Department of Energy (ODOE). (2011). Business Energy Tax Credits [Data file]. 
Retrieved from Public Records Request. 
 
Oregon Legislative Assembly (OLA). (2010). Enrolled House Bill 3680. 75th Oregon 
Legislative Assembly. 2010 Special Session. 
 
Palmer, K. & Burtraw, D. (2005). "Cost-effectiveness of renewable electricity policies." 
Energy Economics 27 (6), 873-94. 
 
Pigou, A.C. (1920). The economics of welfare. London: Macmillan and Co. 
  
59 
 
 
Public Economy Research Institute (PERI). (2009). Clean-energy investments create jobs 
in Oregon. Ed. Center for American Progress. 
 
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21
st
 Century (REN21). (2010). Renewables 
2010: Global Status Report. 
 
Shen, Y., Lin, G.T.R., Li, K., Yuan, B.J.C. (2010). "An assessment of exploiting 
renewable energy sources with concerns of policy and technology." Energy Policy 
38 (8), 4604-16. 
 
Singh, R., & Sood, Y.R. (2011). "Current status and analysis of renewable promotional 
policies in Indian restructured power sector: A review." Renewable & Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 15 (1), 657-64. 
 
Sovacool, B. K. (2010). "A comparative analysis of renewable electricity support 
mechanisms for Southeast Asia." Energy 35 (4), 1779-93. 
 
Stern, N. (2007). The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Tietenberg, T. (2006). Environmental & natural resource economics (7
th
 ed.). Redwood 
City, Calif.: Addison-Wesley. 
 
U.S. Global Change Research Program (U.S. GCRP). (2009). Global climate change 
impacts in the United States. 
 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2008) “Tool for 
the demonstration and assessment of additionality: Version 05.2.” In Report of the 
CDM EB 39 Meeting. 
 
Van‟t Hof, D. & Powell, L. (2010). “Updates to Oregon‟s Business Energy Tax Credits 
(BETC).” 2010. Climate Solutions. http://climatesolutions.org/ 
 
Weiss, E.B. (1990). “In fairness to future generations.” Environment 32 (3): 7-31. 
 
 
